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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the behavioral consequences of control on motivation. We
study a simple experimental principal-agent game, where the principal decides whether
he controls the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the
agent chooses a productive activity. Our main finding is that a principal’s decision
to control has a negative impact on the agent’s motivation. While there is substantial
individual heterogeneity among agents, most agents reduce their performance as a
response to the principals’ controlling decision. The majority of the principals seem to
anticipate the hidden costs of control and decide not to control. In several treatments
we vary the enforceable level of control and show that control has a non-monotonic
effect on the principal’s payoff. In a variant of our main treatment principals can also
set wages. In this gift-exchange game control partly crowds out agents’ reciprocity.
The economic importance and possible applications of our experimental results are
further illustrated by a questionnaire study which reveals hidden costs of control in
various real-life labor scenarios. We also explore possible reasons for the existence of
hidden costs of control. Agents correctly believe that principals who control expect to
get less than those who don’t. When asked for their emotional perception of control,
most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a
signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy. (JEL C7, C9, M5)
Principal-agent relations are typically characterized by a conflict of interest. Therefore,
principals often use control and incentive devices to eliminate agents’ most opportunistic
actions. This paper analyzes how the agent perceives the principal’s decision to control and
how this affects the agent’s behavior. We conducted an experiment in which a principal can
decide either to trust or to control the agent, where controlling rules out the agent’s most
opportunistic actions. Our results show that the decision to control significantly reduces
the agents’ willingness to act in the principal’s interest. Explicit incentives backfire and
performance is lower if the principal controls compared to if he trusts.
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We analyze the interaction of motivation and control in a simple and parsimonious set-
up. In the game under study, an agent chooses a productive activity x which is costly to him
but which increases the principal’s payoff. The distinguishing feature of our experiment is
the principal’s decision. Before choosing x, the principal determines the agent’s choice set.
He can either leave the choice of x completely to the agent’s discretion, in which case the
lowest possible choice of x is zero. Alternatively, the principal can force the agent to choose
at least a minimum level x > 0. The definition of the agent’s choice set can be interpreted as
the degree of control implemented in the agent’s work environment. For example, making
it impossible for the agent to choose below x is the equivalent of implementing various
control or monitoring devices which restrain the agent from his most opportunistic choices.
Not restricting the choice set, on the other hand, represents the absence of such control
mechanisms. Alternatively, the restriction of the choice set can also be interpreted as the
outcome of a corresponding employment contract. For example, if x represents the amount
of working hours, x captures a minimum presence requirement. Similarly, if x stands for the
quality of a produced good or service, x is the minimum quality the agent has to deliver.
Since x is costly to the agent, standard economic theory predicts that the agent will
choose the lowest possible x, which is zero if the principal does not restrict the agent’s
choice set and x > 0 if he does. Since the principal’s payoff is increasing in x, he will
therefore always be better off controlling the agent than not limiting the agent’s choice set.
However, if there are agents who are intrinsically motivated to perform in the principal’s
interest, controlling may actually decrease performance. A potential reason is that agents
do not like to be restricted and perceive control as a negative signal of distrust. In addition,
these agents might also assume that the principal has low expectations. Our main results,
in fact, confirm the hypothesis that control has an adverse effect on agents’ performance.
We find that a majority of the agents in our experiment choose a lower x if the principal
restricts rather than trusts them. We vary the level of x in different treatments. While we
find evidence for the hidden costs of control in all treatments, the net effect on profits turns
out to be non-monotonic. For low levels of x, control generates significantly lower profits
than trust; as x rises, however, control eventually breaks even. In a detailed analysis of
agents’ motives behind control aversion, we find that agents seem to believe that principals
who control expect to receive less than those who don’t, and that agents’ beliefs correlate
positively with their behavior. When asked for their perception of control, most agents
indicate that they perceive the decision to control as a signal of distrust and a limitation
of their choice autonomy. Given the hidden costs of control, principals earn more if they
trust their agents than if they control. Most of the principals in our experiment seem to
understand the adverse effect of control. The majority decides not to restrict the agent’s
choice set but to trust that the agent will perform well voluntarily. Principals who control
hold more pessimistic beliefs about the agent’s performance than principals who trust.
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As agents’ behavior roughly confirms both types of beliefs, our results nicely support the
so-called “self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust” (Niklas Luhmann, 1968).1
We conducted several control treatments both to test the robustness of our results as
well as to isolate the precise impact of control on agents’ motivation. In one of these
treatments, the constraint x is given exogenously, i.e., the agent’s choice set is identical
to that in the main experiment when the principal decides to control. However, since
it is not the principal who implements x, distrust and control are not at issue in this
treatment. If the principal’s controlling decision is behaviorally relevant to the agent, x
should therefore be lower if the principal decides to control in the main treatment than
in the control treatment. This is what we find. In a further treatment, we embed the
principal’s control decision in a standard gift-exchange game. A principal in this treatment
not only decides whether to control his agent but also determines his agent’s wage. In line
with previous studies, we find that agents’ x-choices are generally increasing in the wage
payment, i.e., agents act reciprocally to the principal’s wage choice. Yet, if the principal
controls, the agent’s reciprocal inclination is lower than if the principal does not control.
The result shows that even if the principal can use additional instruments to motivate the
agent, control continues to have a negative impact on agents’ performance. To further test
the robustness of our findings, we conducted a questionnaire where subjects were asked to
state their work motivation in various everyday workplace scenarios. Similar to our lab
evidence, we find that self-reported work motivation varies significantly with the extent to
which agents are exposed to control.
Taken together, our results show that the use of control and explicit incentives entails
“hidden costs” that should be considered when designing employment contracts and work-
place environments. Elements in the labor contract that can be perceived as signals of
distrust and control, such as minimum performance requirements, may harm more than
they help. Similarly, characteristics of the workplace environment that limit freedom of
choice and signal low expectations, such as high levels of monitoring and surveillance, may
be equally counterproductive.
In fact, the hidden costs of control offer a psychological rationale for the incomplete-
ness of many real-life economic contracts. In this sense, our paper offers a contribution
1The intuition of our results is neatly captured by an example reported by David Packard, one of the
founders of the computer company Hewlett-Packard (HP). Packard notes in his memoirs: “In the late
1930s, when I was working for General Electric ..., the company was making a big thing of plant security.
... GE was especially zealous about guarding its tool and parts bins to make sure employees didn’t steal
anything. Faced with this obvious display of distrust, many employees set out to prove it justified, walking
off with tools and parts whenever they could. ... When HP got under way, the GE memories were still
strong and I determined that our parts bins and storerooms should always be open. ... Keeping storerooms
and parts bins open was advantageous to HP in two important ways. From a practical standpoint, the easy
access to parts and tools helped product designers and others who wanted to work out new ideas at home
or on weekends. A second reason, less tangible but important, is that the open bins and storerooms were
a symbol of trust, a trust that is central to the way HP does business” (David Packard, 1995, pp. 135).
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to the literature on incomplete contracts. The degree of contractual incompleteness is an
economic puzzle. Real-life contracts often omit important, verifiable obligations of the con-
tracting parties (or only mention them vaguely), and measurable actions are often linked
to verifiable information in a manner which is seemingly less than optimal. While bounded
rationality on the part of the contracting parties might account for some of this incom-
pleteness, the key question is why many contracts appear to be left incomplete deliberately.
Several explanations have been offered to answer this question. In some situations, for
example, incomplete contracts may be completed by renegotiation design to achieve first
best outcomes, i.e., there is no need to write more complicated contracts (Philippe Aghion
et al., 1994; Georg No¨ldeke and Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995). In other cases, incomplete con-
tracts may actually be superior to more complete contracts. Franklin Allen and Douglas
Gale (1992) and Kathryn E. Spier (1992), for example, argue that offering a more complete
contract may lead the other party to draw negative inferences about the first party’s type.
B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998) show in a repeated game setting
that if some obligations are non-contractible, it may be better to leave other aspects un-
specified, giving rise to so-called “strategic ambiguity” in the design of the contract. Our
study provides a behavioral rationale for the deliberate incompleteness of many real-life
contracts. We show that a large fraction of agents are averse to being controlled and con-
sequently lower their performance if the principal implements a more complete contract. If
the principal anticipates this effect, he may be better off choosing a less complete contract,
leaving the agent substantial discretion and thereby signaling the principal’s trust in the
agent’s non-opportunistic behavior.
Our paper also contributes to the recent literature dealing with the interaction of psycho-
logical and economic incentives (e.g., Bruno S. Frey, 1997; Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini,
2000a,b; Frey and Reto Jegen, 2001; Gneezy, 2004). The analysis differs, however, in several
dimensions with respect to previous studies that have demonstrated dysfunctional effects of
explicit incentives. First, principals in our experiment have a new and yet unexplored deci-
sion possibility. Rather than specifying punishments and rewards, a principal in our game
can determine the agent’s choice set by fixing a positive minimum performance requirement.
These possibilities are common in many real-life labor relations (regulated working times,
high-control working environments, minimum output/quality, etc.) but, to the best of our
knowledge, have not yet been explored in a principal-agent framework. In addition, our
experimental design carefully separates control and trust from payoff-driven reciprocity and
gift exchange. In contrast to previous experiments (Ernst Fehr and Simon Ga¨chter, 2002;
Fehr and Bettina Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and John A. List, 2004; Fehr et al., 2004) it does
not pay for the principal to trust in our model because trusting results in a higher payoff to
the agent which is reciprocated. Instead, trust only pays in our experiment because some
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agents are intrinsically trustworthy and react negatively to the implementation of control.2
A further distinction of our paper is that we are able to obtain individual-level informa-
tion on the agent’s behavior rather than aggregate results alone. In particular, we can
analyze agents’ heterogeneity with regard to their behavioral motivation by distinguishing
between agents who react positively, neutrally, and negatively to control. Finally, our study
highlights previously untested mechanisms for possible dysfunctional effects of incentives.
Earlier studies have shown that incentives may undermine motivation because they provide
new information regarding the importance or the cost of the task (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000a; Roland J.M. Benabou and Jean Tirole, 2003), because they insult the agent (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000b), or because they are in conflict with social norms of fairness and
cooperation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; see
also the discussion in Gneezy, 2004).
Since our results provide empirical evidence for negative effects of control, our paper
is also closely related to Frey (1993) who proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing
the (possibly negative) effects of monitoring on agents’ work effort. Two recent theoretical
papers that investigate the optimal monitoring of heterogenous agents are Dirk Sliwka
(2003) and Andrea Ichino and Gerd Mu¨hlheusser (2004).3
The paper is organized as follows. Details of the experimental design are explained in
the following section. Section II discusses the behavioral predictions. Our main results are
presented in Section III. Section IV reports data from the gift-exchange experiment. Fi-
nally, we present the results from a questionnaire illustrating the applications and economic
importance of the hidden costs of control for real-life labor relations in Section V. Section
VI concludes.
I. Experimental Design
A. Main Treatments
Our design philosophy was to set up an experimental game that allows studying the po-
tential interaction between control and motivation in a parsimonious way. We therefore
implemented the following two-stage principal-agent game. The agent chooses a productive
activity x, which is costly to him but beneficial for the principal. The cost for the agent is
2This difference can, perhaps, best be seen from the fact that none of the present models of reciprocity
and social preferences is able to predict the results of our experiments (see Section II).
3Harry G. Barkema (1995) is the only empirical study we know of that analyzes how monitoring affects
workers’ effort, where the latter is measured by the number of working hours. The study uses data from 116
executives of medium-sized Dutch firms. While the author finds that higher monitoring actually correlates
with fewer working hours in some cases, the causal relationship between the two variables is unclear. A
related literature in social psychology comes from Thane S. Pittman et al. (1980), Mark R. Lepper and
David Green (1975), Robert Plant and Richard M. Ryan (1985), and Michael E. Enzle and Sharon C.
Anderson (1993). None of these papers studies control in a principal-agent relation however.
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c(x) = x, while the benefit for the principal is 2x, i.e., the marginal cost of providing the
productive activity is always smaller than the marginal benefit. The agent has an initial
endowment of 120 while the endowment of the principal is 0. The payoff functions are thus
given by pip = 2x for the principal and pia = 120 − x for the agent. The crucial feature
of our design is the principal’s choice. Before the agent decides on x, the principal deter-
mines the agent’s choice set. He can either restrict the agent’s choice set, in which case the
latter can choose any integer value x ∈ {x, x + 1, . . . , 120}, or he can leave the choice set
unrestricted to x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 120}. The parameter x varies across treatments (see below).
Thus, the principal can control the agent’s decision environment, thereby guaranteeing a
minimal payoff of 2x, or he can leave the decision completely up to the agent, trusting that
the latter will not choose x below x.
We conjecture that the impact of control depends on the level of control which is mea-
sured by the parameter x in our game. If x is low, for example, the positive effect of control
is likely to be marginal; the hidden costs of control on the other hand (if they exist) may
be substantial. As x increases, by definition the positive effect of control rises, since agents
cannot choose below x. In consequence, it may turn out that the overall net effect of control
is actually non-monotonic. For low levels of x, control might generate a lower payoff than
no-control; as x rises the payoff from control increases; eventually, control breaks even.4
To see whether this hypothesis is correct, we implemented a low, a medium, and a high
control treatment. In the low control treatment (C5), the principal can only force the agent
to choose x ≥ 5. He is able to enforce twice as much, i.e., x = 10 in the medium control
treatment (C10). Finally, he can enforce a minimum of x = 20 in the high control treatment
(C20). We made use of the strategy method to elicit the agents’ choices in the experiment
in each of these treatments. Before knowing their principal’s actual decision, the agents
had to decide on x for both possible cases. On a computer screen they were asked to choose
x ∈ {x, x+1, . . . , 120} in case their principal forces them to choose at least x, and to choose
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 120} in case their principal does not restrict their choice set. We used the
strategy method to gain direct information about individual types which will be discussed
in detail below.
B. Control Treatments
We also ran several control treatments to check for the robustness, for possible interpre-
tations, as well as for the validity of our results in a more general economic setting. The
medium control treatment C10 serves as the main basis of comparison for all these treat-
ments.
4Gneezy (2004) provides recent evidence for the non-monotonicity of incentives in a proposer-responder
game.
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Our first control treatment (SR10) tests whether agents’ behavior depends on the strat-
egy method as an elicitation procedure. If the experience of being controlled is emotionally
important, it may well be that the aversion against control is even stronger if agents decide
after having learned whether they are controlled or not. On the other hand, it may be that
the strategy method places too much emphasis on the control vs. trust decision, thereby
inducing agents to overstate their dislike for control. To rule out the possibility that our
results are an artifact of the strategy method, we therefore applied the specific response
method in treatment SR10. Principals first set a minimum of zero or x = 10, then agents
learn their principal’s choice before making their decision. In consequence, each agent
makes only one decision in this treatment — either under control or under no-control.
To test whether it is really the principal’s control decision that affects agents’ moti-
vation, we implemented a second control treatment where the constraint x ≥ 10 is given
exogenously to the agent (EX10). In treatment EX10, the principal and the agent only
play the subgame of the game in treatment C10 that follows the restriction choice of the
principal. As before, the agent is endowed with 120 points. He chooses a productive activ-
ity x ∈ {10, 11, . . . , 120}. Payoffs are 120 − x for the agent and 2x for the principal. The
principal makes no decision.
Finally, we explore the validity of our results in a more general economic setting in a
third control treatment. The main advantage of our simple principal-agent game is that it
allows us to study the hidden costs of control is a setting uncluttered with other factors. The
potential disadvantage is that it may exclude essential features of employment relations that
might be relevant for the robustness of our results. In practice, principals clearly do more
than determining the agent’s choice set. Most importantly, they also set the agent’s wage.
To check whether the introduction of wages has an impact on the hidden costs of control, we
implemented a gift-exchange treatment (GE10) where the principal not only determines the
agent’s minimum level of x but, in addition, pays the agent a wage. More precisely, in the
first stage of treatment GE10 the principal chooses a wage w ∈ {10, 30, 60, 120} and decides
whether or not to force the agent to choose x ≥ 10. Depending on the principal’s decision,
the agent in the second stage chooses x ∈ {10, 11, . . . , 120} if the principal imposes control
and x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 120} if the principal does not impose control in the first stage. Payoffs
are pip = 2x − w for the principal and pia = w − x for the agent. Note that the game in
treatment GE10 is a straightforward modification of our main principal-agent game (C10),
the only difference being that players’ payoffs are now also determined by the principal’s
wage choice. We made use of the strategy method to elicit agents’ choices in this treatment,
i.e., for each possible wage w agents made a choice of x both under the condition where the
principal does and does not implement a minimum of 10.
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C. Procedural Details
Irrespective of the treatment, each principal-agent game was played one-shot. All treat-
ments were framed in a neutral manner.5 All experiments were computerized using the
software “z-Tree” (Urs Fischbacher, 1999) to run the experiment. Subjects were randomly
allocated a role as principal or as agent upon arrival at the lab. Subjects were students
from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. A
total of 804 subjects participated in the experiment, half of them as agents, the other half
as principals. No subject participated in more than one treatment. 140, 144, and 134
subjects participated in the main treatments C5, C10, and C20, respectively. 246 subjects
participated in treatment SR10. Finally, 72 subjects participated in treatment EX10 and
68 participated in treatment GE10. Each session lasted, on average, between 40 and 50
minutes. On average, a subject earned CHF 25.11 (about $20) in the experiment.
D. Questionnaire Study
In addition to our experiment, we also conducted a questionnaire to illustrate the variety
of applications and economic importance of the hidden costs of control in typical real-
life labor relations. We used vignettes in the questionnaire where subjects were exposed
to everyday workplace scenarios. This allows changing conditions along the control-trust
dimension, holding the general workplace scenario constant. 403 subjects participated
in the questionnaire study. None of these subjects participated in any treatment of the
experiment. We provide more information about the questionnaire in Section V.
II. Behavioral Predictions
The behavioral predictions for our experiments depend on the assumptions concerning
players’ preferences. Let us consider the standard case first. If agents are selfish, i.e., only
interested in maximizing their own income, they choose the minimum x. This implies that
they choose x = x if they are restricted and x = 0 otherwise. In consequence, principals
who want to maximize their payoffs should always control the agent’s choice set. According
to this benchmark solution, agents are opportunistic and therefore it inevitably pays to rule
out their most opportunistic choices.
There is ample evidence, however, that many people do not act in a purely selfish manner
but are endowed with social preferences (for an overview of the experimental literature see,
e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000 and Colin F. Camerer, 2003). In the dictator game, e.g.,
proposers often give positive amounts of money (Robert Forsythe et al., 1994; Alvin E.
5In general, subjects were called “participant A” and “participant B”. In the gift-exchange treatment
participants were called “employee” and “employer”. We avoided value laden terms like “trust” or “dis-
trust”.
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Roth, 1995). These findings were recently explained in terms of subjects’ concern for equity
and efficiency (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels, 2000; Gary
Charness and Matthew Rabin, 2002). In light of the experimental evidence and according
to social-preference theories, a substantial fraction of agents in our principal-agent game
are therefore expected to choose an activity x that is strictly larger than the respective
minimum. However, if the agent’s choice exceeds x (i.e., the agent has a relatively strong
preference for equitable outcomes), social-preference theories imply that his choice is in
fact independent of whether a principal controls him or not. This follows because in these
models social preferences are based on payoff distributions and the constraint x ≥ x is not
binding. Only agents with a weak social preference, who choose 0 < x < x if not controlled,
will choose a higher performance (namely, x = x) if controlled. Taken together, as it holds
for the standard economic case, a payoff maximizing principal cannot lose anything but can
possibly gain something from controlling agents with social preferences and hence should
always restrict the agent’s choice set.6
Now suppose that agents are intrinsically motivated to perform in the principal’s interest
but reduce their performance in response to being controlled. A potential reason why we
might see this behavioral reaction is that controlling implicitly signals that the principal
does not expect the agent to perform well. Some agents might perceive this as a signal of
distrust in their intrinsic motivation; others might take it as an indication for how much
voluntary performance the principal expects. In both cases, the agent reacts by choosing a
lower performance than he would have chosen if the principal had not controlled the agent.
If faced with this type of behavioral motivation, the optimal strategy for the principal is thus
the opposite of that described above: a principal is better off trusting and not controlling
the agent. Of course, if the enforceable level of control x is higher than what the agent is
willing to choose voluntarily, controlling also pays if the agent is control averse. Therefore,
the payoff of controlling is likely to be non-monotonic. If x is relatively low, trust pays; as
x increases, control may become the better strategy.
With regard to the exogenous-control treatment EX10, note that both selfishness and
social preferences predict no difference in agents’ behavior between treatment EX10 and the
subgame in treatment C10 that follows the restriction decision. In contrast, if agents are
averse to control, x-choices should be higher in treatment EX10 than in the corresponding
6Formally, according to the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, inequity-averse agents
choose either x = 0 if β < 13 or x = 40 if β >
1
3 . In the first case it pays to control, in the second case
the agent’s choice is unaffected. Choices other than 0 and 40 can be explained by non-linear versions of
the model. Other existing theories of social preferences are not only based on payoff distributions but also
take players’ intentions into account (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger, 2004; Armin Falk
and Fischbacher, forthcoming). None of these theories, however, predict that the principal should refrain
from controlling the agent’s choice set. The reason is that the principal’s decision not to control the agent
can only be perceived as a “kind action” if the agent actually intends to exploit the principal’s trust by
choosing a low performance, in which case the principal, of course, has no incentive to trust the agent.
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subgame of treatment C10. The reason is that while the strategy set and the payoff conse-
quences are identical, the principal does not actively choose the constraint x; instead, it is
imposed exogenously in treatment EX10. Hence, the constraint cannot signal anything.
Finally, the principal sets also the agent’s wage in the gift-exchange treatment GE10.
Based on results from previous studies (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and
Falk, 1999; Gneezy, 2003), we expect reciprocity considerations to become relevant in this
treatment. That is, agents’ motivation to act in the principals’ interest should increase
with the wage payment. This hypothesis is also in line with social-preference theories. As
is true for our main treatments, however, social-preference theories predict that control
is optimal in the GE10 treatment because the controlling decision does not affect agents’
reciprocity. In contrast, if agents are averse to control, control and reciprocity may interact
in a non-trivial way. If wages are low, even reciprocal agents will not choose a high x.
Therefore it pays for the principal to control. For higher wages, however, control may no
longer be optimal. The reason is that by setting a high wage and waiving control, the
principal unambiguously signals his kindness and his trust in the agent’s performance. The
implementation of control in this case on the other hand signals less trust and kindness.
In consequence, the agent’s reciprocal inclination may be less pronounced if the principal
controls compared to if he trusts. This may result in lower payoffs.
III. Main Results
In this section, we present the results from our main treatments. We first report agents’
behavior on the aggregate and on the individual level. We also show the robustness of our
results with regard to the elicitation procedure. We then turn to the principals. Finally,
we discuss possible interpretations of our findings and explore agents’ behavioral motives.
A. Agents’ Behavior
Our first result concerns the hidden costs of control.
RESULT 1: We observe hidden costs of control in all main treatments (C5, C10 and C20).
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure 1a-c. The Figure shows how agents’ choices
are cumulatively distributed given the decision of the principal in the three treatments. If
there were no hidden costs of control, the cumulative distributions of agents’ choices in case
the principal controls (black points) would coincide with the cumulative distributions if the
principal does not control (white points) for all x ≥ x. Obviously, this is not the case in
any of the three treatments. For each value of x ≥ x, there are always strictly more agents
in the no-control condition who chose at least that value of x than in the control condition.
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For example, 67 percent of the agents in treatment C5 (Figure 1a) choose x > 10 when
they are free to choose voluntarily and only 20 percent choose x ≤ 5. In sharp contrast,
only 30 percent choose x > 10 if they are forced to choose at least 5 and 51 percent choose
exactly the minimum x = 5. 34 percent of the agents in this treatment choose the payoff
equalizing level of x = 40 if they are not controlled by the principal, yet only 9 percent do
so if they are controlled. A similar picture emerges in treatments C10 and C20 shown in
Figure 1b and 1c. Independent of the level of x, we see relatively high x-choices from the
agents if they are in an uncontrolled environment, whereas the mass of x-choices is centered
at x if the principal restricts the agents’ choice set.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The shift in the distributions is highly significant in all three treatments. To test this
we modify the distribution of x-choices in the no-control case such that any observation
x < x is set equal to x. Under the assumption that control has no behavioral impact, the
resulting modified distributions should be the same as the ones generated by control. This
can be rejected for all treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.001)7
While control entails hidden costs, by definition it may also generate benefits. Forcing
agents to choose at least x implies that any choice below x is ruled out for sure. Our next
result shows how the costs and benefits translate into profits.
RESULT 2: The hidden costs of control outweigh the benefits in all main treatments.
Average performance is higher if the principal does not control than if he does so. These
differences are significant in the C5 and the C10 treatment but not in the C20 treatment.
Result 2 is supported by Table 1. Table 1 shows agents’ average and median performance
in our main treatments if the principal does and does not restrict the agent’s choice set. This
table conveys a clear message. In all treatments, both average and median performance
levels are higher in the no-control compared to the control case. Depending on the level of
x the differences are actually quite large. In treatment C5, agents make choices that are on
average more than twice as high if they are not controlled by their principal than if they are
controlled; in treatment C10 average choices are 31 percent higher. Median differences are
even stronger. As we have seen in Figure 1, if the principal sets a minimum of x, more than
half of the agents choose exactly the minimum; hence median performance equals 5, 10, and
20 in treatments C5, C10, and C20 if the principal controls. The median performance in
case the principal trusts, on the other hand, is 20, 20 and 40. These performance differences
7We report the results of two-sided tests throughout the paper.
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are significant in the C5 and the C10 treatment (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.001).
Agents’ choices in the C20 treatment are also slightly higher for principals who trust but
not significantly so (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.957).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
If we compare agents’ average performance under control and no-control across the
treatments (i.e., for different levels of x), the data reveal a further interesting finding. While
the enforceable level of control x plays a crucial role if control is actually implemented, it
plays no important role if the principal decides to trust. Agents do not behave differently
if the principal refrains from implementing a minimum of x = 5 compared to if he refrains
from implementing a minimum of 10, or 20 (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.550). This suggests
that agents seem to punish the principal’s decision to control rather reward his decision to
trust. We will return to this issue in Section III.C, when we compare agents’ behavior to
the data from the exogenous-control treatment EX10.
Result 1 emphasizes the hidden costs of control caused by the existence of intrinsically
motivated agents choosing a lower performance if controlled than otherwise. Result 2 shows
that control has also some benefits, since selfish agents are forced to choose a higher level
of x if they are controlled than if they are not controlled. In the following, we provide
more information about agents’ heterogeneity with regard to their behavioral reaction to
control. Since we used the strategy method, we are able to quantify how many agents
reacted negatively, positively, or in a neutral way depending on the principal’s decision.
RESULT 3: There is a strong heterogeneity among the agents in all main treatments. We
see agents who react positively, neutrally, or negatively to the principal’s implementation of
control. The last group is always the majority.
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 2. This table shows the absolute and relative
frequencies of agents who react positively, neutrally, or negatively to the implementation of
control in the three main treatments together with their average choices given the principal’s
decision. If all agents were selfishly motivated, reactions would be positive and the average
performance would equal x if controlled and zero otherwise. Table 2 instead reveals that,
depending on the treatment, only between 20 and 37 percent of the agents show a positive
performance reaction to control. On average these agents choose slightly higher levels of x
than the required minimum. For the second group of agents, the decision of the principal
is irrelevant in their choice of x. This group consists of between 16 and 21 percent of
the agents, depending on the treatment. Finally, the largest group in each of the three
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treatments consists of individuals who show a negative response to being restricted in their
choice set. 64, 57, and 42 percent of the agents reveal this behavioral pattern in treatments
C5, C10, and C20, respectively. They are responsible for why, on average, it does not pay
for the principal to control. Their average choice of x if controlled is 10.3, 18.7 and 21.5
for x equal to 5, 10, and 20, respectively. If they can decide freely, on the other hand, their
average choice is 32.1, 32.3, and 39.8.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In sum, our results show that the costs of control are substantial. The results do not
suggest, however, that trust is always better than control. They in fact show that the
hidden costs and benefits of control depend on various factors. First, they depend on
the relative frequency of agents’ types. When the number of opportunistic agents with
a low intrinsic motivation to perform is relatively high, controlling only generates minor
costs and trusting is likely to be suboptimal. Second, the level of the explicit incentives is
important. To illustrate, compare the principals’ average profits in the C5, C10 and the
C20 treatment. In the C5 treatment, controlling lowers the motivation of many agents
while the benefits of control are relatively small given the little enforcement power of x =
5. As a consequence, the difference in average profits between controlling and trusting
amounts to 24.4− 50.2 = −25.8. Controlling also lowers motivation in the C10 treatment,
but the enforcement power is stronger. As a result, the net benefit of control is now
35.0 − 46.0 = −11.0. Finally, in the C20 treatment there are again negative effects of
control but due to the much stronger enforcement power, average profits differ insignificantly
(50.8− 53.4 = −2.6). We suspect that control will outperform trust for even higher levels
of x. In this sense, our results suggest that the relation between the principal’s payoff
and the strength of incentives is indeed non-monotonic: if the principal has only weak
incentives at his disposal it may be better to trust, since controlling lowers motivation of
the intrinsically motivated agents but increases the performance of opportunistic agents
only marginally. As controlling technologies and enforcement power increase in strength,
however, the disciplining effect eventually dominates the negative effect on motivation.
Before we turn to the principals, we test the robustness of our results with regard to
the elicitation of agents’ behavior. We elicited agents’ choices with the help of the strategy
method in treatments C5, C10, and C20. This was predominantly done to enable us to
study potentially different types of agents (Result 3). To rule out the possibility that
agents’ behavior is an artifact of the strategy method, we conducted a control treatment
(SR10), where we used the specific response method instead. In this treatment, agents
decided only after having learned of the principal’s decision. Our results do not indicate
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any effect of using the strategy method vs. the specific response method in our context.
The average (median) choice of an agent is 23.6 (20) if the principal does not implement a
minimum level of 10 in the specific response treatment. Using the strategy method, we get
an average (median) of 23.0 (20). These differences are not significant (Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0.822). If the principal decides to set a minimum of 10, the average (median) is 19.6
(10.5) if we use the specific response method, and 17.5 (10) in the strategy method. Again
there is no significant difference (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.589). Finally, the hidden costs
of control, i.e., the difference in the distributions between the control and the no-control
condition, are significant in the SR10 treatment as well (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.007).8
B. Principals’ Behavior
We now turn to the principals. Given the average responses of the agents, it is clearly not
optimal for payoff maximizing principals to control their agent, in particular in treatments
C5 and C10. Our next result shows that principals seem to have understood this.
RESULT 4: The majority of the principals chooses not to control the agent.
Support for Result 4 comes from Table 3, which reports the principals’ decisions. In all
treatments the majority of principals decides to trust rather than to control. The differ-
ences are largest in the C5 treatment, where only 26 percent of the principals control and
74 percent trust. The respective numbers are 29 and 71 percent respectively in the C10
treatment. These differences are statistically significant for both treatments at any conven-
tional level (Binomial test, p < 0.001 in each treatment). The data suggest that principals
anticipate possible adverse effects of controlling their agents because they voluntarily give
up the option to guarantee 2x points for themselves. The differences are smallest and in-
significant in the C20 treatment, where roughly half of the principals controlled while the
other half did not. In light of the performance levels actually chosen, these results make
sense: the larger the payoff differences between trusting and controlling, the larger is the
fraction of principals who trust.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The results shown in Table 3 suggest that even though a majority of principals chose an
optimal strategy, some did not. This raises the question why some of the principals chose
to control while others trusted. To better understand the principals’ decisions, we study
8As above, we account for the difference in the support of x by setting each observation x < 10 in the
no-control case equal to 10.
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principals’ beliefs. These beliefs were elicited right after principals had made their decision.
In all treatments, we asked them to state their expectation about the agent’s choice of
x.9 In the C5 and the C20 treatments, we also asked them about their counterfactual
beliefs, i.e., what those principals who controlled think they would have gotten had they
not controlled, and vice versa. The main finding is summarized in our next result.
RESULT 5: Principals who control have lower expectations about x than principals who
do not. Expectations coincide with agents’ average performance in most of the cases.
Principals’ beliefs are displayed in Table 3. Principals who control expect to get less
than those who trust in all main treatments. In the C5 treatment, e.g., principals expect
to receive on average 17.8 if they control and 29.6 if they trust. Similarly, principals who
control expect 19.4 and 25.3 on average in treatments C10 and C20, whereas their trusting
counterparts in the same situation expect on average 25.7 and 34.1. The differences in be-
liefs are statistically significant in each of the treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.007).
The result suggests that principals share different views about their agents’ cooperative-
ness. Those who trust are rather optimistic, while those who control seem to be rather
pessimistic. It is necessary to consider also principals’ counterfactual beliefs, however, in
order to substantiate this claim. Do those principals who control expect to receive less if
they trust and vice versa? The answer is affirmative. In both the C5 and the C20 treat-
ments, principals who think that they get more if they control than if they trust choose to
control and vice versa. This implies two things. First, principals act rationally conditional
on their beliefs. Second, there are in fact two types of principals. Those who are optimistic
believe that trust pays, while those who are pessimistic expect control to be the better
strategy.10
A comparison of the principals’ expectations with agents’ actual choices reveals that
expectations are indeed quite accurate. For example, principals who control in treatment
C10 expect to get 19.4 on average when they in fact earn 17.5. At the same time, prin-
cipals who trust in this treatment expect on average 25.7, and indeed they receive 23.0.
Table 3 shows that principals’ expectations are in general a bit higher than agents’ actual
performance. However, with the exception of the principals who trust in treatment C20,
a Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypothesis that beliefs and actions are the same
both if principals do not control and if they do so (p > 0.13 in each of these cases). In the
9Beliefs were not paid.
10Interestingly, both types of principals agree in their expectations about agents’ behavior in case of
control. If we compare the beliefs of principals who control with the counterfactual beliefs of principals
who trust in treatments C5 and C20, a Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypothesis that beliefs are
the same (p > 0.4 in both treatments). The actual difference between principals arises when it comes to
their expectation about agents’ performance in case they are trusted.
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C20 treatment, principals who trust expect to receive 34.1 but in fact they get only 26.7
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.071). This optimism might have been due to the expectation
that not choosing to control if one could have enforced a relatively high amount will be
rewarded by particularly high choices of x, which apparently is not the case. We will return
to this issue in the following section.
The principals’ beliefs and the agents’ actual performance in our experiment illustrate
what has been called the “self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust” (Niklas Luhmann, 1968).
Principals who have rather pessimistic beliefs and hence choose to restrict the agent’s
choice set experience that their beliefs are indeed confirmed by their agents’ relatively
low average performance. On the other hand, principals who have optimistic beliefs and
trust their agents see their beliefs roughly confirmed as well. In consequence, different and
reinforcing “firm cultures” may emerge. Managers in low trust firms, on the one hand,
have little trust in their employees and predominantly rely on control. These managers will
not be surprised to see performance at the minimum, confirming their pessimistic beliefs.
The locked storeroom policy of General Electric in the 1930’s is a perfect example for such
firm culture (see footnote 1). High trust firms, on the other hand, are governed by the
expectation of mutual trust. Employees are trusted in these firms and given responsibility.
This “empowerment” of agents actually produces non-minimal performance, substantiating
the initial beliefs held by the managers.
C. Exploring Agents’ Motives: What Drives the Hidden Costs of Control?
In the preceding section we have shown that control has an adverse effect on many agents’
performance. We explore possible interpretations of this finding in this section. We first
present results of the EX10 treatment that allows checking whether the control decision of
the principal really drives our results. Second, we examine whether agents’ beliefs about
the principal’s expectations play a role in agents’ behavior. Finally, we report agents’
answers to a free-form questionnaire, in which they were asked to describe their emotional
perception of being controlled by the principal.
Strategy space vs. control decision: In principle, the negative effect of control in our
main treatments could be due to the mere difference in the agents’ strategy space, i.e., to the
difference in the support of x between the control and the no-control condition. To isolate
the effect of the principal’s control decision, we compare agents’ choices in the subgame that
follows the control decision in treatment C10 with agents’ choices in treatment EX10 where
subjects play only this subgame. Agents’ strategy space is identical (10 to 120) in both
situations. However, in the subgame of treatment C10 the principal decided to control the
agent; in treatment EX10 x is imposed exogenously, i.e., any control decision of the principal
is absent. If the controlling decision of the principal generates the negative effect, the x-
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choices in the EX10 treatment should exceed those in the C10 subgame following the control
decision. This is what we find. If agents are exogenously constrained to choose x ≥ x = 10,
the average (median) choice of an agent is 28.7 (20) compared to 17.5 (10) if the principal
implements the same restriction endogenously. These differences are statistically significant
(Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.001). At the same time, there is no significant difference
between agents’ choices in the EX10 treatment and agents’ choices in the subgame of the
C10 treatment when the principal trusts, i.e., does not impose control (Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0.523).11 Thus, agents’ behavior is indeed a reaction to the principal’s decision
to control.12 Moreover, since the average performance in the trust subgame of the C10
treatment is not higher than in the EX10 treatment, it seems that agents punish the
principal’s controlling decision rather than rewarding his decision to trust. This is also
in line with our finding from the main treatments showing that agents do not respond
differently to the waiving of different levels of control x (see Table 1).
Agents’ beliefs about principals’ expectations: The fact that agents react to the princi-
pal’s decision suggests that the latter may provide a signal — for example, a signal about
his expectations concerning the agent’s performance. Recall that principals who control
have lower expectations than principals who trust (Result 5). If agents understand this, it
seems plausible that agents differ in their belief about the principal’s expectations: agents
who are controlled probably believe that the principal has lower expectations with regard
to x compared to agents who are free to choose voluntarily. Moreover, agents’ beliefs are
likely to affect their behavior. Charness and Dufwenberg (2004), for example, provide evi-
dence that guilt aversion is an important motive in principal-agent relations. Agents who
believe that the principal has low expectations may feel less “guilty” when choosing a low
x than agents who believe that the principal has high expectations. In consequence, low
expectations generate low performance. At the same time, the agent can also interpret low
expectations in the sense that the principal distrusts him to perform well. If the agent
doesn’t like to be distrusted, because he regards himself being a trustworthy person, the
principal’s low expectations similarly reduce the agent’s performance. In order to check
whether agents’ beliefs play a role, we asked agents the following question in the control
treatment SR10, where we used the specific response method: “What do you think were the
expectations of participant B (principal) concerning your transfer decision?”13 The question
was asked directly after the agent had made his decision. The results are as follows. The
11Again, we account for the difference in the support of x by setting each observation x < 10 in the
no-control case equal to 10.
12This result can be interpreted in terms of intention. In a treatment where the outcome of a “decision”
cannot be attributed to the actor’s intention, reciprocal responses are typically weaker (Sally Blount, 1995;
Falk et al., 2000, 2003; Charness, 2004).
13We asked this question only to the 52 agents who participated in the last three sessions of treatment
SR10. Beliefs were not paid.
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average (median) belief of an agent who is forced to choose x ≥ 10 is 26.1 (30) compared to
35.9 (40) if the agent is free to choose voluntarily (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.075). Thus,
agents who are controlled think that the principal has lower expectations than do agents
who are not controlled. To test whether beliefs also affect agents’ behavior, we ran a linear
regression of agents’ transfers on their beliefs, controlling for the principal’s decision. The
regression shows that agents’ transfers and beliefs are significantly and positively correlated
(coef. = .2962, p = 0.050). Thus, the less an agent believes that his principal expects, the
less he is willing to perform in the principals’ interest.
Agents’ emotional perception of control: Agents who believe that the principal has low
expectations may lower their performance because they feel less guilty towards the principal;
alternatively, they may perform more poorly because they experience control as a signal
of distrust. To shed further light on agents’ perception of control — and to distinguish
between the two motives — we asked all agents in our main treatments C5, C10, and
C20 the following question: “What do you feel if participant B (principal) forces you to
transfer at least x points?” The question was asked after all decisions in the experiment
were made. Answers were given in free form. It turns out that the answers can be organized
in six categories. These are: distrust, lack of autonomy, greed, understanding, neutral, and
other.14 Note that none of the subjects mentioned that he or she felt less guilty about
transferring a low x to the principal. Figure 2 shows the distribution of answers across the
six categories for all subjects who participated in the role of an agent in treatments C5, C10,
or C20 (data pooled over treatments, n = 209). The dark bars show the answers of agents
who reacted negatively to control, i.e., who chose a lower x when they were controlled than
when they were not controlled by the principal (n = 114). The light bars show the answers
of the remaining agents who either reacted negatively or who made the same choice of x in
both conditions (n = 95).
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Let us first look at the agents who reacted negatively to control in the experiment.
Figure 2 shows that the emotional perception with the highest frequency is distrust. 49
14An answer was categorized as indicating “distrust” if the subject explicitly mentioned a feeling of not
being trusted to transfer a positive amount. Category “lack of autonomy” contains all answers, where the
subject expressed a negative feeling of being restricted in his or her freedom of choice. “Greed” represents
answers where the subject felt that the principal was a greedy or a petty person. Categories “understanding”
and “neutral” contain answers where the subject said that he or she understands the principal’s decision
or where the subject did not express any particular feeling, respectively. Finally, the category “other”
contains all answers that could not be classified into one of the other categories. Note that answers may
well fall into more than one category. For example, a subject may mention both a feeling of distrust and
of a lack of autonomy. In consequence, frequencies generally do not add up to 1.
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percent of the agents who are willing to transfer a positive amount say that they feel
distrusted if the principal forces them to transfer at least x and that they are hurt by
this distrust in their voluntary motivation.15 Next, a comparable number of agents (48
percent) say that they feel a lack of autonomy and a reduced opportunity for determining
the outcome at their own will.16 18 percent feel that the principal seems to be a greedy
or a petty person. Finally, only a minority (6 percent) expresses understanding for the
principal’s decision to restrict their choice set, and none of the agents says that he or she
feels neutral.
In contrast, agents who do not react negatively in the experiment mostly express their
understanding for the principal’s decision (41 percent). 16 percent do not express any
particular feeling. Interestingly, many of these agents also perceive the controlling decision
of the principal as a signal of distrust (27 percent) or as a lack of autonomy (21 percent).
Unlike the previous group, however, these agents do not lower their performance. Either
they choose the same value of x independent of the decision of the principal, or they chose
a higher x, mainly because the controlling decision forces them to do so. Apparently, the
principal’s distrust in the agent’s performance seems well justified in the latter case.
In sum, our results indicate that the controlling decision really matters. Agents seem
to believe that principals who control expect to get less than those who don’t (which is
correct, as Result 5 shows), and their beliefs positively correlate with their behavior. When
asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that
they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust or a limitation of their choice
autonomy.17
IV. Hidden Costs of Control in the Gift-Exchange Game
The treatments we have discussed so far are extremely simple. This has the advantage
of allowing us to study hidden costs of control in a setting uncluttered with confounding
factors. On the other hand, our set-up abstracts from many essential features of employ-
ment relations that are potentially relevant and that may interact with hidden costs of
control. Most importantly, principals set wages in practice. Since the payment of wages
signals something about the principals’ expectation about the agent’s trustworthiness and
15A typical response in this category reads as: “The fact that he does not trust me to transfer enough
points offends my pride,” as one subjects puts it.
16For example, one subjects says: “If I feel to be forced to do something, I am no longer willing to give
more than necessary. I give a little bit more than what is required, because I want to make the decision
myself and without any influence from the outside.”
17The importance of autonomy is consistent with recent evidence, e.g., from the European Survey of
Working Conditions showing that workplace flexibility has a strong positive effect on workers’ job satisfac-
tion and that this effect is mainly driven by workers’ positive evaluation of an increased autonomy over how
to perform their tasks and the opportunity to participate in decision-making (Thomas K. Bauer, 2004).
19
willingness to work, wages complicate the perception of control in a non-trivial way. In
this section, we therefore report the results from our gift-exchange treatment GE10. Recall
from Section I that the principal both chooses a wage w ∈ {10, 30, 60, 120} and decides
whether or not to set a minimum x ≥ 10 in the first stage of this treatment. Depending on
the principal’s decision, the agent in the second stage chooses x ∈ {10, 11, . . . , 120} if the
principal imposes control and x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 120} if the principal does not impose control.
Payoffs are pip = 2x− w for the principal and pia = w − x for the agent.
The gift-exchange treatment GE10 is essentially the same as our main treatment C10
but allows principals to set wages. We therefore expect reciprocity considerations on the
side of the agents to become relevant. Numerous gift-exchange experiments similar to ours
have shown that agents provide efforts above the contractually enforceable level and that
efforts are on average increasing in the wage payment. The reason is that high wages
are perceived as kind or fair and reciprocal worker respond to this perceived kindness by
providing relatively high efforts (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999;
Gneezy, 2003). We therefore expect a positive relation between x and the wage level in our
gift-exchange treatment. The interesting question, however, is how the reciprocity motive
interacts with the control decision. Assume that the principal pays a low wage of 10. In
this case, a selfish agent chooses x = 0 but even a reciprocal agent will most likely choose
x < 10. In fact given the results from previous gift-exchange experiments the highest x
that is likely to be chosen is the one that equates the payoff of the principal and the agent,
which equals x = 20/3 < 10 if the wage is 10. Thus, even in the presence of strongly
reciprocally motivated agents, x will be higher if the principal controls than if he does not.
For higher wages, however, the optimality of control vs. trust depends on the interaction
between perceived kindness of high wages and perceived unkindness of control. If a principal
sets a high wage and refrains from controlling, he unambiguously signals his trust and the
expectation of a high x. If he pays a high wage and controls, however, the signal contains on
the one hand high expectations and kindness resulting from the high wage and on the other
hand low expectations and distrust because of the control decision. The next result shows
that reciprocal responses are in fact less pronounced if the principal controls compared to
if he trusts.
RESULT 6: We observe reciprocity in the gift-exchange treatment, i.e., a positive relation
between wages and x. Reciprocity is significantly weaker, however, if the principal controls
than if he does not control.
Support for Result 6 comes from Figure 3. The figure shows for each wage the median
values of x chosen by the agents. Both under control and under no-control, wages and x-
choices are positively correlated. This follows from a simple regression where we regressed
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performance on wages (with robust standard errors, clustered on individuals). The perfor-
mance coefficient is positive and highly significant in both conditions (control condition:
coeff. = 0.1909, no-control condition: coeff. = 0.2538, p < 0.001 in both conditions). Figure
3 reveals that the principal’s controlling decision again entails a hidden cost — this time by
partly crowding out agents’ reciprocity. As conjectured, agents choose higher x levels for a
wage of 10 if they are controlled than otherwise. For higher wages, however, the median val-
ues of x are always higher if the principals does not control than if he does. Remember that
in all our main treatments the median of x is equal to x if the principal controls. This holds
also in the gift-exchange treatment. As Figure 3 shows the median in the control condition
is 10 independent of the wage, indicating that the majority of the agents choose exactly the
minimum when controlled. In the no-control condition on the other hand, median values
increase in the wage, reaching a level of 20 for wages equal to 120. The resulting hidden
costs are significant: if we modify agents’ choice distributions such that any observation
x < x is set equal to x, the distributions are significantly different for each wage above the
minimum wage 10 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.01 for wages equal to 30, 60, or 120).
There are of course also benefits from controlling. The selfish agents who choose x < 10 if
not controlled are forced to choose 10 if controlled. The net effect of costs and benefits is
displayed in the averages of x. For wages equal to 10, 30, 60, and 120, averages are 10.7,
12.6, 19.1, and 31.0 if the principal controls and 5.0, 10.1, 20.9, and 32.6 if the principal
does not control. Thus, the hidden costs slightly outweigh the benefits for wages above 30,
i.e., the negative effect of control on reciprocal agents is slightly stronger than the positive
effect of control on the selfish agents.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The results from the gift-exchange treatment reveal that control partly crowds out
agents’ motivation to reciprocate high wages with high performance levels. Interestingly,
the principals in this treatment again anticipate this. While only 10 percent of the principals
trust the agent when paying a wage of 10 (n = 10), 50 percent of the principals trust for
wages above 10 (n = 24). The number of principals who trust increases significantly in
the wage principals pay (Spearman rank correlation, p = 0.029, n = 34). This finding also
corroborates the result that there are pessimistic principals who decide to pay low wages
and to control, while the optimistic principals appeal to reciprocity by paying relatively
high wages and refrain from controlling.
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V. Control at the Workplace: Questionnaire Data
We added some “realism” in the previous section by allowing principals to set wages. In this
section we go much further and study how control and explicit incentives affect motivation
in typical work environments. This section illustrates the variety of applications of hidden
costs of control as well as their economic importance. Moreover it shows that the results
we obtained in stylized principal-agent relations in the lab carry over to quite realistic,
everyday workplace scenarios.
Our research tool is a questionnaire where we presented subjects with vignettes. We
study five different workplace “scenarios”. For each of these scenarios we then present two
“conditions”, one where the principal trusts the employee, and one where he controls or uses
explicit incentive devices. The description of a particular scenario is identical for the two
conditions. Each subject goes through all five scenarios but the subject only goes through
one of the two conditions for a given scenario. We ask each subject to indicate his work
motivation on a five-level scale ranging from “very low” to “very high” for each of the five
scenarios/conditions.
Table 4 displays all scenarios and conditions: in the first scenario, the employee works
in a supermarket and is responsible for checking the balances in the cash registers. In
principle, he could easily take out money for himself but he is assumed not to do so. In the
trust condition for this scenario, the principal does not check the employee; in the control
condition the principal controls whether the employee reported the cash balances truthfully.
In the second scenario, the agent just started a new job and receives instructions about
what he is expected to do. The agent in the trust condition is asked to meet his working
time obligation exactly; in the control condition he has to sign a formal agreement about
his working time. The third scenario is a job interview. The agent truthfully reports on his
qualifications and work experience. He offers his previous employer as a reference, who can
verify his statements. In the trust condition, the new employer believes what the agent says
and hires him; he hires him in the control condition only after having consulted the previous
employer. In the fourth scenario, the employee begins a new job in a small business, where
he is explained that the copying machine may not be used for private purposes. In the
trust condition, the room with the copying machine is open; in the control condition the
room is locked and the employee has to ask his boss for the key. Finally, the employee
in the fifth scenario works for a company that has recently provided internet access on all
personal computers, but this access may only be used for business purposes. In the trust
condition the management asks all employees to respect this rule; in the control condition
the management installs special software, which lists all internet sites the employees have
visited.
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
403 subjects participated in our vignette study. Thus we get a total of about 2,000 work
motivation responses for the ten conditions (see Table 4). All subjects are undergraduate
students from the University of Zurich. None of these subjects participated in any of our
experimental treatments. The results in Table 4 resemble our findings in the experiments.
Signals of distrust and control affect the agents’ motivation negatively. For all work sce-
narios, the relative frequencies of agents indicating that they have a high or very high work
motivation are always lower in the distrust than in the trust condition. For example, 71
percent of the subjects in the trust condition of Scenario 1 indicate a high or very high
work motivation. The number of highly or very highly motivated subjects in the control
condition, however, who learn that their principal controlled whether they checked the cash
balances truthfully, is only 26 percent. If the principal believes the prospective employee
and hires him, 87 percent of the subjects report a high or very high work motivation (Sce-
nario 3). The corresponding number drops to 44 percent if the principal first checks the
reference. Work scenario 4 mirrors the Hewlett-Packard example in footnote 1: work mo-
tivation is much higher if doors are open rather than locked. Likewise formal agreements
about working hours (Scenario 2) or controlling employees’ internet access reduces motiva-
tion. In all scenarios, control reduces work motivation significantly (Mann-Whitney test,
p < 0.0001 for each of the five scenarios). Of course, we cannot conclude from this result
that it would pay for the principal to trust his agent rather than to control him. What
these results do show, however, is that there are hidden costs of control: the agent’s work
morale is dampened.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We analyze the interaction of control and motivation in a principal-agent relationship in
this paper. We introduce a simple game, which allows studying the potential impact of
control in a parsimonious way. Our results show that a majority of the agents exhibits
control-averse behavior, i.e., they are less motivated to perform well if the principal forces
them to provide a minimum level of performance. This also holds in our gift-exchange
treatment where principals cannot only decide on controlling or trusting the agent but
also on the agent’s wage payment. The reciprocal relationship between wages and effort
is weaker in the presence of control in this treatment. Given the significant hidden costs
of control in all our treatments, it may not come as a surprise to see that a majority of
the principals in our experiment decide in fact to trust rather than to control their agent.
The economic importance and possible applications of our experimental results are further
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illustrated by a questionnaire study which reveals hidden costs of control in various real-life
labor scenarios.
We also explore possible reasons for the existence of hidden costs of control. Agents
correctly believe that principals who control expect to get less than those who don’t. When
asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that
they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice
autonomy.
The main message of our paper is that control and explicit incentives entail hidden costs,
which should be taken seriously. The message is not, however, that it is always better for
principals to trust than to control. In fact, we show that the costs and benefits of controlling
agents depend on various factors. First, they depend on the composition of agents’ types.
When facing rather opportunistic agents with a low intrinsic motivation to perform in the
interest of the principal, controlling generates only minor costs and trusting is likely to be
suboptimal. Second, the strength of the explicit incentives is important. The results from
our main treatments reveal a non-monotonic relation between agents’ performance and the
strength of incentives: if the principal has only has weak incentives at his disposal it is better
to trust since controlling reduces motivation of the intrinsically motivated agents but only
increases the performance of opportunistic agents marginally. As incentives get stronger,
however, the disciplining effect eventually dominates the negative effect on motivation.
Our results suggest important implications for the design of organizations. First of all,
the potential gains from control have to be weighted in light of the hidden costs of control
(not to speak of the explicit costs of installing control devices). Faced with agents who
have heterogeneous motivations, the key management goal is to develop incentive contracts
that discipline the opportunistic agents without reducing motivation of the intrinsically
motivated ones. Second, when introducing incentives, the principal should be careful not
to signal a negative message. Agents’ performance was much better in the EX10 treat-
ment, where control was implemented exogenously, compared to the subgame following the
controlling decision of the principal. This finding corroborates, for example, the important
role of third parties like consultancies, governments, etc. with regard to the implementation
of control and explicit incentives. Third, our results from the gift-exchange game suggest
that it is a bad decision to trust and to distrust at the same time. Paying low wages and
refraining from control is certainly dominated by low wages and control. On the other
hand, when paying high wages, controlling the agent leads to a lower performance than not
controlling the agent. It seems that principals have to confess their “true” expectations:
either to trust or to control; trusting a bit is likely to be interpreted as not trusting at all.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Agents’ choices dependent on the principal’s decision
Treatment
C5 C10 C20
Principal controls Average 12.2 17.5 25.4
Median 5 10 20
Principal does not control Average 25.1 23.0 26.7
Median 20 20 40
Notes: Number of observations: n = 70(C5), n = 72(C10), n = 67(C20).
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Table 3: Principals’ behavior and beliefs
Treatment
C5 C10 C20
Control Trust Control Trust Control Trust
Relative share 0.26 0.74 0.29 0.71 0.48 0.52
Average belief of x 17.8 29.6 19.4 25.7 25.3 34.1
Average counterfactual belief of x 12.8 14.9 — — 10.3 23.0
Average x actually chosen 12.2 25.1 17.5 23.0 25.4 26.7
Are beliefs “correct”? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Counterfactual beliefs were only elicited in treatments C5 and C20. Beliefs are
“correct” if the Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypothesis that actual choices and
corresponding beliefs are the same (p > 0.1).
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of agents’ choices in treatment C5 (panel a), C10 (panel
b), and C20 (panel c). The Figure shows all observations x ≤ 50. In each treatment, there
were a few x-choices above 50. These observations are summarized as x > 50.
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Figure 2: Agents’ emotional perception of control: “What do you feel if participant B
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Figure 3: Hidden costs of control in the gift-exchange game
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